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Using a computable general equilibrium model we assess the effects of services trade liberalization 
in Poland and its major trading partners in the context of the WTO Doha Round negotiations 
and the ongoing process of trade liberalization within the enlarged European Union. The paper 
provides a thorough descriptive analysis of the data on trade in services. It gives a complete picture 
of the sectoral and geographical structure of Poland’s trade in services in 2007. We also provide an 
analysis of revealed comparative advantage indices based on sectoral data.
The  review  of  literature  is  focused  on  a discussion  of  the  methodology  for  assessing  the 
barriers to trade in services. The core of the paper consists of a CGE simulation using the GTAP 
model. We employ the Hoekman (1995) tariff equivalents as a proxy for the initial level of trade 
barriers. Our four scenarios include those of complete liberalization, EU-only liberalization and 
two intermediate scenarios. The most optimistic scenario is expected to bring a 0.9% increase in 
Polish GDP and welfare improvement of close to 0.8% of GDP value. However, more than half of 
this gain is attributed to the liberalization within the EU that is bound to happen independently 
from the Doha process.
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1. Introduction1
The  Doha  Round  is  the  most  complicated  round  of  all  previous  GATT/WTO  multilateral 
negotiations. The most difficult problems arise in the field of agricultural trade. However, the 
negotiations regarding services are also fairly complicated. It stems, inter alia, from the fact that 
the regulation of trade in services constitutes a new area of GATT/WTO activities.
The first agreement on services liberalization (GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services) 
was reached only 20 years ago, during the previous GATT round (1988–1993). During the Uruguay 
Round the general rules regarding liberalization were formulated. The rules of the GATS are in 
general quite similar to those of the GATT, governing liberalization of merchandise trade. However, 
the framework for services negotiations and commitments is different, since there are no tariffs 
or other similar barriers. Therefore, the negotiators created four modes of the supply of services, 
constituting  the  framework  for  specific  market  access  and  non-discrimination  commitments. 
However, the real progress in making specific commitments regarding liberalization within the 
Uruguay Round was very limited (Egger, Lanz 2008).
The services negotiations in the Doha Round are simpler in comparison to Uruguay, since the 
GATS framework already exists. However, despite generally more restrictive access regimes and, 
thus, potentially higher gains from liberalization than in merchandise trade, many governments 
have found it difficult to undertake economically significant commitments across a broad range of 
services. This reluctance for undertaking commitments has many reasons; one of them is probably 
related to the fact that economic implications of services liberalization are not well known. The 
empirical analysis of the results of services liberalization is usually more difficult in comparison 
to the effects of merchandise trade liberalization.
The progress in the Doha Round negotiations has indeed been slow so far (Adlung, Roy 2005). 
Not all WTO members submitted their GATS offers of liberalization. Between May of 2005 and 
March of 2008 only 30 revised offers were submitted, mainly from developed countries with only 
a few  from  developing  ones.2  In  fact,  many  governments  exclude  all  sectors  from  their  offers, 
which produces a snow ball effect: the more exclusions, the higher vulnerability of governments 
to domestic lobbies with vested interests and the fewer possibilities for trade-offs between WTO 
members (Mattoo 2005; Jara, Dominguez 2006). In 2007, Members continued to address the issues 
of  Special  and  Differential  Treatment  (SDT)  of  developing  countries  in  services.3  But  the  real 
progress in negotiations had been stalled till the beginning of 2009. Moreover, the financial and 
economic crisis of 2008–2009 reinforces protectionist sentiments in many countries and does not 
facilitate the completion of the Doha Round.
Nevertheless,  it  is  worthwhile  to  evaluate  possible  implications  of  trade  liberalization  in 
services for a country such as Poland for several reasons. Firstly, during the internal political 
1    This paper is based on results of a research project financed by the Polish Ministry of Economy. The opinions   
expressed by authors in the paper do not necessarily reflect the positions of Ministry of Economy or the National 
Bank of Poland.
2     Only the following developing countries submitted their revised services offers: Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, Chinese 
Taipei, Colombia, Egypt, Honduras, Hong Kong (China), India, Macao (China), Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, 
Suriname, Thailand, Turkey and Uruguay (www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_e.htm).
3     Document WTO, Special Session of The Council For Trade In Services, TN/S/32, 24 July 2007.Implications of the Doha Round negotiations ... 
discussions on Services Directive4 within the EU, Poland has been frequently cited as a country 
that may be a source of problems for some other “old” members states.5 Secondly, Poland, being 
a new member state of the EU, faces a double liberalization challenge from internal (within EU) 
and external (WTO) competitors.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second part, we present a descriptive analysis of 
Poland’s trade in services. It gives a complete picture of the sectoral and geographical structure 
of Polish trade in services. We also provide an analysis of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 
indices based on sectoral data. In the third part, we will discuss the possible methodologies of 
assessing the barriers to trade in services. The Hoekman (1995) tariff equivalents will be used in 
the paper as a proxy for the initial level of trade barriers. In the final part, we will make use of 
the Hoekman equivalents in order to pursue a CGE simulation based on the GTAP model. We will 
present four scenarios analyzing implications of complete liberalization, EU-only liberalization and 
two intermediate WTO scenarios. We will compare the present structure of Poland’s comparative 
advantage (RCA) with simulated changes in trade in services.
2. Structure of Polish trade in services
Polish data on trade in services have only been in line with the EU classification since 2005 and 
come from the balance of payments statistics. The data presented here are for the year 2007 and 
are based on the latest available BOP statistics. The data contain some minor errors, mainly in 
unclassified services, but they usually constitute only an insignificant share of total trade.
  Polish exports of services were equal to 20.884 million EUR6 and imports to 17.499 million 
Euro in 2007. The major EU partners of Poland in services trade were the following: Germany, Great 
Britain, France and the Netherlands. The share of EU 25 was equal respectively to 74.0% of total 
exports and 75.3% of imports and was growing in the recent three years. The main non-EU trade 
partners (and their share in Polish exports) were the United States (5.88%), Russia (3.46%), Canada 
(0.57%), Japan (0.29%), India (0.20%), Turkey (0.20%), South Korea (0.17%) and Israel (0.16%).
Given the fact that the trade surplus in services in 2007 was relatively small, a comparison 
of  shares  of  a sector  in  total  exports  and  imports  reflects  roughly  the  competitive  position  of 
that sector. A significantly higher share of exports than imports implies a surplus and a strong 
competitive position. In the case of transportation (205),7 its share in total services exports was 
32.12% and 23.50% in imports, for travel (236) the share in exports was 36.80% and 32.21% in 
imports, finally for other services (981) the respective shares were equal to 31.8% and 44.19%.
More  disaggregated  sectoral  data  show  that  in  the  case  of  freight  sea  transport  (208)  the 
share of exports was 3.62% and 4.88% of imports, while passenger sea transport was relatively 
insignificant. Moreover, Poland had a visible surplus in the passenger air transport (211), since 
4    Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal 
market, Official Journal L 376 of 27 December 2006.
5    “Polish  plumber”  threatening  local  companies  in  France  has  been  frequently  cited  in  discussions  on  possible 
implications of services liberalization in the European Union. The comparative advantage of Poland is presumably 
in labor intensive sectors (see RCA indices). 
6     An increase by 27.6% in comparison to 2006.
7    The numbers in parenthesis correspond to BOP classification used in the Appendix (Table 1). J. Hagemejer, J.J. Michałek, T. Michałek 
its share of exports was 3.16% and 2.22% of imports; however a deficit in auxiliary and other air 
transport services (213) was observable. For other transport services (214) the high surplus was 
mainly due to large net exports of road transport services (223); its share of total exports was equal 
to 18.77% and 9.95% of imports.
Trade in the sector of “other services” was much more diversified. In the case of construction 
services (250) Poland had a very strong competitive position with share of exports equal to 4.61% 
compared to 1.26% of imports, which was increasing in the recent years. The country has a nearly 
balanced position in postal and courier services (246) and in cultural and recreational services 
(289). However one can see that in other subsectors Poland was, in general, a net importer. This 
was the case of telecommunication services (247) with shares of 1.58% of exports against 2.77% of 
imports, and reinsurance (257) with shares of 0.03% of exports against 1.01% of imports. However 
the largest trade deficit can be noted in royalties and license fees (266), since its share of exports 
was 0.36% and 6.54% of imports. This weak competitive position may be attributed to a low overall 
level of expenditures on research and development in Poland.
The analysis based on export and import shares is only a crude measure of competitive position. 
This comparison does not say much on the relative position in comparison to other countries. The 
Table 1
Revealed comparative advantage of Poland against EU-25 countries (weighted avg. 2006–2007)
Service sector Code RCA
Passenger transport on sea 207 0.5
Freight transport on sea 208 0.8
Supporting, auxiliary and other sea transport services 209 0.6
Passenger transport by air 211 1.0
Freight transport by rail 212 0.7
Supporting, auxiliary and other air transport services 213 0.4
Rail transport 219 3.1
Road transport 223 3.3
Inland waterway transport 227 0.9
Other supporting and auxiliary transport services 232 1.2
Travel 236 1.3
Postal and courier services 246 0.4
Telecommunication services 247 0.6
Construction abroad 250 2.7
Reinsurance 257 0.0
Insurance auxiliary services 258 1.7
Financial services 260 0.1
Computer services 263 0.4
Information services 264 0.3
Merchanting and other trade related services 269 0.2
Miscellaneous business, proffessional and technical services 273 1.0
Audio-visual and related services 288 0.4
Other personal, cultural and recreational services 289 1.1Implications of the Doha Round negotiations ... 
simplest way of doing it is to analyze the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index. It has been 
frequently used in the analysis of merchandise trade and can also be applied to trade in services. 
Polish revealed comparative advantage (RCA) against the EU 25, can be expressed as the ratio of 
the share of a specific sector in the total exports of Poland to the share of this specific sector8 in the 
total exports of the EU 25. The analysis of Polish revealed comparative advantage in transportation 
(RCA index: 1.71) and travel (RCA index: 1.26). The high RCA index in transportation is mainly due 
to road transport. However a comparative disadvantage is recorded in other services (RCA index: 
0.59). A more disaggregated RCA indices for Poland are shown in Table 1.
Thus, looking at net trade position and RCAs in different sectors we can state that Poland enjoys 
comparative advantage in sectors requiring large amounts of low-skilled labour force (road and rail 
transport or construction abroad) and a weak one in sectors requiring substantial quantities of 
physical and/or human capital (e.g. financial services). This pattern of trade in services reflects 
relative factor abundance of Poland against its major partners in the EU and is – in general – in line 
with neoclassical (Heckscher-Ohlin) theory of merchandise trade.
The liberalization of services in the framework of the Doha Round, may have an impact on 
trade,  admittedly  a limited  one  and  mainly  concerning  trade  with  non-EU  partners.  Thus,  in 
assessing the implications of WTO negotiations, we should also describe the pattern of Polish trade 
with major non-EU partners. The relevant data, illustrating relevant average exports’ and imports’ 
shares for 2006–2007, are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 in the Appendix.
The major Polish non-EU imports of transport services come from a few countries only. Imports 
of passenger sea transport (207) come from Japan, and the United States. For freight sea transport 
(208) the main partners of Poland are the United States, Taiwan, China, Russia, Hong Kong, Japan 
and Norway. Finally, in the case of supporting, auxiliary and other transport (209), important non-
EU partners are China, the United States, Egypt, Norway and Japan. The main destination of Polish 
exports in passenger air transport (211) are the United States, Canada, Russia, Switzerland and 
Israel. Imports in this sector come from the United States, Switzerland, Turkey and Russia. In the 
case of freight transport by air (212), the key trading partners are the United States, Switzerland, 
Canada, Japan, China and Brazil for exports and the United States, Russia, China, Switzerland, and 
Hong Kong for imports. Services in rail transport (219) are mainly traded with Switzerland, Russia, 
the United States and, to a lesser extent, China (only in the case of imports). Trade in road transport 
(223) services is mainly carried out with Switzerland, Russia and the United States for exports, and 
Russia, China and the U.S. for imports.
In the travel sector (236), EU countries dominate the Polish trade as well. However one 
should mention the United States, Russia and Japan as main non-EU destinations for Polish 
exports and United States, Croatia, Egypt, Turkey and Switzerland as key countries of services’ 
imports.
The geographical pattern of trade in other services (981) is similar to that in previously described 
sectors; the EU dominates as well and similar countries are the major non-EU partners. In postal 
and courier services (246), the biggest non-EU partners are Switzerland and the United States in 
exports, and the United States, Switzerland, Canada, Russia, Norway and Australia in imports. 
Polish exports of telecommunication services (247) go mainly to the United States, Switzerland and 
Canada and imports come from United States, Switzerland and Russia. In the case of construction 
8    Thus a RCA index bigger than 1 means that Poland has a revealed competitive advantage relative to the EU 25.J. Hagemejer, J.J. Michałek, T. Michałek 10
(250), that is crucial for the Polish comparative position, the key non-EU destinations of exports are 
Russia, Norway and, to lesser extent, the United States while imports come mainly from Russia.9
In the insurance services (253) – mainly reinsurance (257) – the key suppliers to Poland are 
the United States, Switzerland and Russia, while exports go only to Russia and Switzerland. Trade 
in financial services (260) is dominated by the Unites States and Switzerland in exports as well 
as imports. Whereas imports of royalties and license fees (266) are coming from the Switzerland, 
United States, Japan and Norway, while Polish exports are insignificant. Finally, miscellaneous 
business, professional and technical services (273) are mainly exported to Switzerland, the United 
States, Norway, Russia and India while imports in this sector are coming from the United States, 
Switzerland, Russia, Japan and Israel.
Summing  up,  Polish  trade  in  services  is  dominated  by  EU  25  members.  Developed  OECD 
countries such as the United States, Switzerland, Norway, Japan and Canada are other significant 
partners. The other important trading partners are Russia and Croatia in Europe as well as China, 
Hong Kong, Israel and Korea elsewhere. Trade with those non-EU countries can be affected by Doha 
Round liberalization of services trade. Will possible expansion of trade be in line with Poland’s 
revealed comparative advantage? Will these changes reflect the neoclassical merchandise trade 
theory, based on relative factor abundance?
3. Measuring barriers and tariff equivalents in services trade10
The theory of trade in services is fairly new and less elaborated in comparison to developments 
in the neo-classical or modern theory of merchandise trade. In mid-eighties authors argued that 
trade in services is similar to trade in goods and the same tools of analysis can be applied (see e.g. 
Hindley, Smith 1984).
Recent studies and new theoretical developments have shown that, in reality, trade in services 
is different from trade in goods in many aspects; therefore merchandise trade theories can be 
applied only to a lesser extent than previously thought. The differences result mainly from the 
heterogeneity of services. The majority of them are intangible, which means that they can neither 
be stored nor consumed in the future. Thus, in the majority of cases the “unity of time and place” 
is necessary, i.e. a transaction is feasible only when the service provider and the consumer are 
in the same place and time. The close contacts between consumers and producers are therefore 
frequently needed and require movement of natural persons. Thus, either a consumer must travel 
to the country in which services are provided (as eg. in the case of tourism) or the service provider 
should be present in the country where the product is delivered (e.g. construction services).
The other distinctive feature is that many services fulfill an intermediation role or generate 
network externalities, which happens rarely in the case of goods (Hoekman 2006). Horn and Shy 
(1996) argue that many services are “bundled” with goods, and that the associated service-input 
bundle is nontradable in the sense that it must be provided locally. In this case, additional direct 
investment facilitating labour movements is frequently necessary in order to set up sales office and 
9          Poland has a very large trade deficit in construction services with Russia, and high surplus with EU countries. This 
pattern of trade reflects relative factor abundance as well.
10        The review of methods may be found in Chen, Schembrii (2002) and Walsh (2006). An excellent recent review of 
literature is provided by Hoekman (2006). Implications of the Doha Round negotiations ... 11
provide the service itself (e.g. banking services).11 On the other hand some services can be traded 
in a fairly similar fashion to trade in goods, and do not require movement of persons (e.g. legal 
services provided by the internet). In this context, the effects of services liberalization in some 
sectors should capture network effects and/or should be related to FDI and factors movements.
Thus, it is fairly difficult to apply the merchandise trade theories to all types of heterogeneous 
services. In the papers reviewing services’ literature (e.g. Whalley 2003 or Hoekman 2006), authors 
focus on describing the differences between trade in goods and in services or present the empirical 
results of models analyzing effects of trade liberalization rather than discuss potential theoretical 
framework for trade in services. According to the authors’ knowledge, there is no universal theoretical 
trade model aiming at describing roots, patterns and effects of liberalization in service sectors.
However, in empirical studies the methods applied are usually similar to those in the standard 
merchandise trade analysis: the often employed models include gravity models for ex-post analysis 
or CGE models for ex-ante analysis.12 Nevertheless, authors of such studies usually have to face the 
challenge of obtaining a measure of existing trade barriers.
Research regarding measurement of trade barriers in services is fairly recent. In many cases, 
the approach is similar to those that were previously developed to measure non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) to merchandise trade (see e.g. Deardorff, Stern 1998). These measures shall reflect existing 
restrictions and are equivalent to import tariffs in merchandise trade. The restrictions to market 
access in a given sector are present in the form of legal or administrative constraints, defining obli-
gations of companies providing services at a given territory, and are usually difficult to quantify.
There are a few methods of estimations of tariff equivalents in services. Broadly speaking, they 
can be classified as frequency, quantity-based and price-based measures.13 In all cases the goal 
is to estimate tariff equivalents, measuring the difference between domestic and world price of   
a given service stemming from different trade barriers. With such estimates in hand it is possible 
to analyze trade implications of services’ liberalization.
There are several approaches, based on the above-mentioned methods. The simplest, proposed 
by Hoekman (1995), is based on analysis of services’ commitments, undertaken by WTO members 
in the framework of GATS. The main advantage of this method is its simplicity and comparability 
among large number of sectors and countries. The main weakness of this method is that it is based 
on historical commitments from mid 1990’s (end of the Uruguay Round) and contains some degree 
of arbitrariness in defining tariff equivalents. Nevertheless, it is particularly useful in the analysis 
of services liberation in the framework of GATS.
The second approach is based on detailed sectoral analysis of existing various restrictions. 
This approach is usually based on sector specific questionnaires completed among service 
providers.  The  questions  refer  e.g.  to  restrictions  regarding  regulatory  and  administrative 
opacity, explicit barriers to trade and investment, administrative burdens on start-ups, barriers 
to  competition,  and  state  control.  Then,  those  restrictions  are  weighted  and  aggregated  to 
11    Thus, the local prices can be largely differentiated due to dissimilar regulations affecting prices of local inputs. In 
other words, the law of one price may not hold in the case of services. The law of one price says that close substitutes 
should have the same prices in different locations, adjusted for transport costs and trade barriers.
12    There are also attempts to use firm-level data to analyze implications of services liberalization. In the recent study 
Arnold et al. (2006) find that services liberalization in the Czech Republic induces changes in services providing 
firms and has a significant and positive impact on the productivity of downstream manufacturing firms.
13    Hoekman (2006) provides an excellent overview of methods used and results of empirical studies. J. Hagemejer, J.J. Michałek, T. Michałek 12
restrictiveness’ indices or tariff equivalents. This approach was used by Warren (2001), who 
developed  Restrictiveness  Index  Scores  for  Telecommunications  Services.14  A slightly  more 
refined approach was adopted by ENERPI group (De Bruin, Kox, Lejour 2006). The authors 
measure regulatory heterogeneity among EU member states. An even more elaborate approach 
was  presented  in  the  Copenhagen  Economics’  (2005)  assessment  of  restrictions  on  service 
provision  in  the  EU  countries.  In  this  study,  questions  regarding  existing  entry  barriers 
were  organized  in  more  than  40  subcategories.  Then,  authors  transformed  this  qualitative 
information into a single quantitative measure.
The third approach is based on the gravity model of trade. This methodology has been widely 
used to estimate NTBs in merchandise trade (Deardorff, Stern 1998). Taking the total difference 
between  actual  and  predicted  trade  flows  frequently  enables  an  estimation  of  the  importance 
of tariff equivalents. This procedure has been initially used by Francois (1999) and Park (2002). 
However, this procedure leads sometimes to an overestimation of the significance of NTBs (it 
is difficult to distinguish if barriers arise from regulatory or other factors, e.g. physical, from 
trade barriers not accounted for in the empirical model or from a misspecification of consumer 
preferences). A possible refinement of the specification of the models is to include an explanatory 
variable  measuring  NTBs  in  the  gravity  equation  (e.g.  based  on  frequency  measures,  such  as 
Hoekman’s). Tariff equivalents are then computed using a benchmark “free trade” reference case, 
where all NTBs are set to zero. Walsh (2006) presented a study, based on this approach. This 
methodology  requires  independent  information  on  NTBs  and  high  quality,  detailed  bilateral 
statistics on trade in services.
In our paper we follow the first approach, as proposed by Hoekman (1995). We will use his 
tariff equivalents in order to estimate the implications of services liberalization in the Doha Round. 
The choice of the method is driven mostly by data availability: detailed surveys are unavailable 
for the relevant subset of countries and services trade data are not complete enough to perform 
a full-fledged econometric analysis. In fact, the results provided by Walsh (2006) and Park (2002) 
and own authors’ attempts to estimate service trade barriers with the available international trade 
in services data have proven not to be robust to the choice of the estimation technique and there 
was no clear advantage of estimated trade barriers over the ones provided by Hoekman. Similarly, 
the extent of the research needed to provide global coverage of the type of study performed by 
Copenhagen Economics (2005) or Warren (2001) seemed infeasible.
The principles of non discrimination and national treatment are the core rules of GATS. Here, 
in contrast to GATT, the coverage of national treatment is applied only to sectors listed in country’s 
schedule of commitments, and only insofar as existing measures are nor exempted. In addition the 
GATS agreement introduces the concept of market access. Its scope is determined by a positive 
listing of sectors in the WTO schedules of commitments.
A specific commitment is an undertaking to provide market access and national treatment 
for the service activity in question. Thus, specific GATS commitments have a similar effect to 
a merchandise tariff binding – they are a guarantee that the conditions of entry and operation in 
the market will not be changed (will not deteriorate) for foreign suppliers.
14    The report of Warren (2000) was prepared in the framework of Australia’s Productivity Commission. Implications of the Doha Round negotiations ... 13
The General Agreement on Trade in Services distinguishes between four modes of supplying 
services trade:
•	 	 Mode 1: Cross-border supply. It is analogous to trade in goods, and arises when a service 
crosses a national frontier, for example, air or maritime transport across borders, purchase of 
software or insurance by a consumer from a supplier located abroad.
•	 	 Mode 2: Consumption abroad. It occurs when the consumer travels to the territory of service 
supplier, for example, purchase of tourism, education, health services, and a visit to a law 
office abroad.
•	 	 Mode  3:  Commercial  presence.  It  involves  foreign  direct  investment,  for  example,  when 
a foreign bank, telecommunications or electricity firm establishes a branch, subsidiary or plant 
in the territory of another country.
•	 	 Mode 4: Movement of individuals. It occurs when independent service providers or employees 
of  a multinational  firm  temporarily  move  to  another  country  for  business  consulting  or 
construction.
Among these modes of supply commercial presence (Mode 3) tends to be the dominant mode of 
supply for a majority of services, and cross-border trade (Mode 1) is the next most important. Since 
there are 155 non-overlapping service sectors in the GATS classification list, and for each sector 
there are four possible modes of supply, a total of 620 possible measures of openness/binding factors 
exist for each WTO member. As commitments scheduled in GATS apply to national treatment and 
market access separately, there are potentially 1240 data cells for each Member (620x2).15 In his 
paper Hoekman (1995) uses several types of frequency measures. The most important one is the 
so called “average coverage”, which is equal to the sectors/modes listed as a share of maximum 
possible commitment, weighted by the openness/binding factors (similar to import coverage of non-
tariff measures in merchandise trade).
According to Hoekman this measure is reflecting the degree of relative restrictiveness of the 
services regime, with the assumption that the higher is the coverage of commitments, the more 
open the regime is. The average coverage enables comparisons of degree of restrictiveness between 
countries and sectors. Hoekman classifies GATS commitments into three categories and assigns 
a numerical score to each category:
•	 If no restrictions are applied for a given mode of supply in a given sector, a value of 1 is assigned.
•	 If no policies are bound for a given mode in a given sector, a value of 0 is assigned.
•	 If some restrictions are listed for a given mode in a given sector, a value of 0.5 is assigned.
Hoekman calculates tariff equivalents by first constructing a list of benchmark guesstimates 
of what tariff equivalents of the most protectionist nation might be. Then the “tariff equivalent” 
of a given country is obtained by multiplying this guesstimate by (1 minus the Hoekman index). 
Thus, if the most restrictive country worldwide had restrictions equivalent to a 100% tariff, then 
a country with a 0.9 restrictiveness index, would have a tariff equivalent of 90%.
The comparison of degree of liberalization in GATS schedules of commitments, as measured 
by Hoekman indices, reveals significant differences among WTO members. The relevant data are 
shown in Table 2. The high income countries have undertaken more significant commitments in 
terms of sectors covered (76%) and in terms of weighted coverage (about 40%). The Uruguay Round 
15      The number of entries varies among the countries since many sectors are not included in the list of commitments 
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liberalization  commitments  of  low  income  developing  countries  are  much  more  modest.  The 
average sector number of commitments is 15.4%, while weighted coverage is close to 6%.
The results of Doha Round can be similar to GATS commitments undertaken during Uruguay 
Round negotiations. At present developing countries discus modalities of special and differential 
(S&D) treatment, which will enable them to limit the scope of commitments and liberalization of 
trade in services. In our simulations we will take into consideration this likely outcome of Doha 
Round in services.
There have been many critiques of Hoekman methodology. Some authors point out that his 
indices reflect only commitments in 1995 and not real barriers as they exist at present. Others 
argue that in fact there are many hidden administrative barriers (like opacity of procedures) which 
can be revealed only through detailed questionnaire based analysis of replies of services’ suppliers. 
Finally the “benchmark” tariff equivalents are based on Hoekman’s guess evaluation and not on 
empirical research. Some of them (for example in passenger air transport sector) are probably much 
lower today in comparison to mid 1990’s.
On the other hand there are some obvious merits of Hoekman indices and tariff equivalents. 
They are easy to calculate for all WTO members, who have listed their schedules of concessions 
in  GATS.16  They  are  comparable  between  countries  and  sectors.  Finally,  they  are  well  suited 
to analyze the implications of new commitments of WTO members, which will (hopefully) be 
undertaken at the end of Doha Round.
16    The Hoekman methodology enables to analyze the level of liberalization for new WTO members, which joined the 
organization after the completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994 (like P.R of China).
Table 2
Averages for specific commitments indicators by country income group as of 1995 (Modes 1 and 3 only)
Mode of supply
Mode 1: cross-border supply Mode 3: commercial presence
Income group All Low Middle High All Low Middle High
Countries 106 25 47 34 106 25 47 34
Number of commitments 42.0 15.4 31.7 76.0 42.0 15.4 31.7 76.0
Coverage 27.1 9.9 20.4 49.0 27.1 9.9 20.4 49.0
Weighted coverage (WCov) 19.2 5.6 12.2 38.7 20.1 6.1 12.4 41.1
WCov, without financial  
& telecommunication   
services
19.1 4.5 12.3 39.3 20.8 4.7 12.8 43.5
WCov, only business services 24.2 2.9 14.9 52.7 27.4 4.7 16.5 59.2
Source: Egger, Lanz (2008), Table 2, p. 23. Implications of the Doha Round negotiations ... 15
4. Services trade liberalization – CGE simulations
4.1. Introduction
In order to assess the potential effects of services trade liberalization we employ the commonly used 
GTAP model, a multi-sector, multi-country computable general equilibrium model. The model and 
the corresponding GTAP database used here are developed by the Global Trade Analysis Project at 
Purdue University. The model used is of the version 6.2a that is the most current version.17
The  general  structure  of  the  model  is  relatively  simple.18  The  demand  side  of  the  model 
relies on an assumption of the existence of the regional household that takes all the expenditure 
decisions  within  the  economy.  This  entity  is  allocating  expenditures  to  private  consumption, 
government expenditures or savings.
This  structure  has  very  convenient  characteristics.  The  utility  function  governing  the 
division of expenditures is in fact a social utility function and can be used in the analysis of the 
changes social welfare caused by changes in economic policy instruments. It has its drawbacks 
however – the expenditure decisions on the part of government are unrelated to the government 
budget constraints; the expenditures are allocated according to the total budget constraint of the 
household and not taking into account the government receipts (therefore the budget deficit is 
partially financed by a foregone current consumption of the households and foregone savings).
The structure of preferences of the regional household is based on the multiply nested utility 
function. In the top nest the household decides on the allocation of expenditures between the 
private consumption, government consumption and savings according to the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function.  The  government  consumption  is  a Cobb-Douglas  composite  of  goods  coming  from 
different sectors. Private consumption demand is governed by a Constant Difference of Elasticity 
preferences to account for the non-homothetic nature of consumption demand (see McDougall 2002 
for implementation details). Two levels of CES aggregates are used to distinguish domestic from 
foreign goods and to differentiate the foreign goods by country of origin (a so-called Armington 
assumption).
Firms  produce  using  the  primary  factors  purchased  from  the  regional  household  and 
intermediate goods. The sources of primary factors are purely domestic – it is assumed that 
factors of production are strictly immobile internationally and mobile within a region (with 
exception  of  land  and  natural  resources).  Intermediate  goods  can  be  either  domestically 
produced and imported and goods coming from different sources are assumed to be imperfect 
substitutes.
The  production  function  is  also  a multi-level  concept.  On  the  top  level,  given  the  factor 
prices the firm formulates its demand for value added and intermediate goods. It is assumed that 
no  substitution  is  possible  between  value  added  and  intermediate  goods  (Leontief  production 
function). The value added is a composite of skilled and unskilled labour, capital and land together 
with natural resources. Value added production function is a CES and therefore varying degree of 
substitution between factors is permitted across sectors.
17     As of 17th of January 2010.
18     For a complete description of the model consult Hertel, Tsigas (1997).J. Hagemejer, J.J. Michałek, T. Michałek 1
The GTAP database has information on 57 sectors in all of the regions.19 This data includes 
information on the production volume, sales both domestic and international, intermediate use 
and primary factor use. It also contains information about bilateral trade between countries in 
both goods and services. The database is compiled in a fashion that assures a complete picture of 
each included country’s economy – it constitutes a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) that assumes 
that all the expenditures are equal to the incomes of all agents in a region (in other words, all 
the inflows are equal to the outflows). The services sectors are disaggregated, while – in order 
to complete the GE model – the remaining sectors are aggregated into agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing. Version 6 of the database uses year 2001 as a reference year.20
4.2. Four scenarios of services liberalization
We run four GTAP simulations demonstrating possible implications of services liberalization. This 
is a comparative statics analysis: we compare ”snapshots” of the world economy before and after 
liberalization exercises. The indicators shown, reflect the relative changes stemming from the 
assumed reductions of services trade barriers’ tariff equivalents.
  In the first scenario (“EU”) we assume that liberalization of trade in services occurs only 
among  EU  members,  according  to  the  Services  Directive  and  further  liberalization  initiatives 
leading to a “genuine” internal market with no restrictions (i.e. tariff equivalents equal 0). This 
liberalization happens independently from the undertakings of the Doha Round. In other words, it 
is a “non-success” scenario of the Doha negotiations.
The second scenario (called: “100-30-10”) should – in our opinion – reflect the short run effects 
of services liberalization in the Doha Round. Those results are “added” to the first scenario. Here 
we assume that tariff equivalents of all developed countries will be reduced by 30%. According 
to authors opinion, it reflects the present stage of negotiations. The revised country offers do not 
include many significant reductions in service trade barriers. We also assume that commitments 
and reductions of developing countries will be even more restricted, due to Special and Preferential 
Treatment. At present, commitments of developing countries represent a 1/3 of commitments of 
developed ones. In this scenario we assume that tariff equivalents in developing countries will be 
reduced only by 10%.
The third scenario (called: “100-50-25”) is a more optimistic one, and reflects – in our opinion 
– the long run effects of the successful Doha Round. Here, we assume that the creation of a genuine 
internal market within the EU is accompanied by significant liberalization in all WTO countries. 
Namely, we assume that tariff equivalents in developed countries are reduced by 50%, while those 
in developing ones are reduced by 25%. Those results can be achieved through significant progress 
in services negotiations and more responsive approach of developing countries. Indeed, in early 
1990’s some developing countries in Asia and South America realized that unilateral liberalization 
of trade policy can be beneficial for importers. These results should be treated with caution, since 
GTAP model is a static one (in this version) and compares only two static equilibria.
19    The GTAP services sectors do not match BOP statistics sectors, which were discussed in the first section of the 
paper. 
20    Version 7 of the GTAP database was not yet available at the time when the analysis was carried out.Implications of the Doha Round negotiations ... 1
The last scenario (called “maximum”) is only a benchmark one, and not a viable option. It reflects 
potential effects of complete liberalization of services trade in all countries. Here we assume, that all 
tariff equivalents are set at zero level after liberalization. This scenario forms a reference point for 
comparisons with more realistic and limited results of the Doha Round in services.
The initial levels of tariff equivalents in services are taken from Hoekman (1995) original work. 
The level of tariff equivalents for groups of countries analyzed in our simulations is calculated 
as  a weighted  average.21  Since  not  all  analyzed  countries  were  listed  in  Hoekman  paper,  we 
21    We use GDP levels of countries present in the original Hoekman results as weights.
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Poland 10 10 32 94 167 183 25 25 27 14 28
Germany 10 10 32 94 167 183 25 25 27 14 28
UK 10 10 32 94 167 183 25 25 27 14 28
Netherlands 10 10 32 94 167 183 25 25 27 14 28
France 10 10 32 94 167 183 25 25 27 14 28
Italy 10 10 32 94 167 183 25 25 27 14 28
Czech Republic 10 10 32 94 167 183 25 25 27 14 28
Region of EU 15 10 10 32 94 167 183 25 25 27 14 28
Region of NMS 10 10 32 94 167 183 25 25 27 14 28
Switzerland 5 8 25 83 169 181 17 17 28 14 40
Croatia 19 34 48 90 170 190 20 20 45 19 50
Region of Europe 5 13 29 95 167 106 21 21 26 16 26
Russia 23 24 42 93 169 166 31 31 38 16 42
Region of Former USSR 23 24 42 93 169 166 31 31 38 16 42
China 26 35 48 90 170 184 37 37 40 20 48
Japan 5 5 38 85 167 143 25 25 29 7 42
United States 5 5 28 95 168 94 13 13 22 3 42
Mexico 24 21 46 95 169 140 40 40 41 16 31
Canada 6 9 22 92 167 106 18 18 26 20 50
Latin America 25 25 49 95 170 130 35 35 44 19 49
India 34 36 50 95 170 186 36 36 47 19 46
Korea 16 21 46 87 169 181 35 35 36 14 50
Thailand 28 33 40 87 168 188 35 35 42 17 48
Region of Asia 23 35 46 90 169 162 29 29 43 18 45
Turkey 5 34 36 85 166 91 9 9 35 19 42
MENA and Middle East 30 33 49 94 170 179 29 29 43 18 48
Region of Africa 19 18 42 95 170 121 41 41 35 17 36
Australia and Oceania 11 8 41 86 167 182 17 17 25 15 31
Source: calculations based on Hoekman (1995).J. Hagemejer, J.J. Michałek, T. Michałek 1
calculated average tariff equivalents, by taking equivalents of listed countries. For example the 
tariff equivalents for African countries, Russia and other former Soviet Union countries were based 
on average equivalents for countries listed in the Hoekman paper. The aggregation to GTAP sectors 
was made by applying the 2-digit ISIC weights given in the Hoekman’s original paper. The results of 
those aggregation are shown in Table 3. Due to the fact that the actual costs of non-tariff barriers in 
services trade are not accounted for in the GTAP database, in applying the liberalization scenarios 
to the world economy as presented by the model we follow the approach that does not require us 
to recalibrate the global SAM. Namely, we incorporate the liberalization in a change of the iceberg- 
-type  transport  costs  by  shocking  the  GTAP  AMS  parameter  –  import  augmenting  technical 
change. Quoting model documentation: “Shocks to ams(i,r,s) represent the negative of the rate of 
decay on imports of commodity or service i from region r imported by region s. When ams(i,r,s) is 
shocked by 20%, then 20% more of the product becomes available to domestic consumers – given 
the same level of exports from the source country. In order to ensure that producers still receive 
the same revenue on their sales, effective import prices (pms) fall by 20%” (Hertel, McDougall, 
Itakura 2001).
4.3. Simulation results
The import price shock imposed on the modelled world economy leads immediately to an increase 
of imports of services. In most economies the level of GDP goes up. We can distinguish two major 
sources of those gains:
1.  The  demand  for  exported  services  goes  up  in  all  countries  (except  the  scenario  where 
liberalization is limited only to the European Union).
2. Lower prices of imported intermediate services lead to a decrease in the costs of production 
of all goods in the economy which further leads to an increase of domestic and export supply.
Simulated changes in the level of real GDP are shown in Table 4. According to our simulation, 
Polish gains from liberalization amount to 0.5% to 0.9% of GDP. If the liberalization is only limited 
to the implementation of the Services Directive within the EU, the gains vary from 0.5% GDP for 
Poland to 1.4% of GDP in the Netherlands. It is worth noting that this distribution of gains depends 
on the initial share of trade in services in the GDP – i.e. countries with larger trade shares gain 
more.22 In the “EU” scenario of liberalization, large services traders are likely to slightly loose if 
liberalization does not include them (e.g. Switzerland).
In the case of multilateral liberalization (100-30-10), the change in GDP in Poland is greater 
than in the „EU” scenario. However, the difference is not significant and amounts to roughly 0.1 
percentage points of GDP. Only in the case of the unrealistic scenario of complete liberalization, 
the  change  in  gains  between  the  two  scenarios  is  equal  to  0.36  pp.  Again,  this  result  comes 
from the fact that Poland has a relatively low trade share in services compared to other analyzed 
countries and the share of services trade with third countries in the total Polish international trade 
of services is not very high either.
22    Given the calibrated trade shares of the utility functions, countries that trade less than other countries are likely to 
trade less after liberalization, especially if liberalization is multilateral. Implications of the Doha Round negotiations ... 1
Table 4 
Changes in real GDP (in precent)
Region
Scenario
EU 100-30-10 100-50-25 Maximum
Poland 0.52 0.62 0.69 0.88
Germany 0.73 0.95 1.10 1.49
UK 0.73 0.93 1.08 1.47
Netherlands 1.39 1.79 2.07 2.79
France 0.58 0.67 0.73 0.92
Italy 0.60 0.77 0.89 1.20
Czech Republic 1.04 1.36 1.58 2.17
Region of EU 15 0.86 1.17 1.38 1.92
Region of NMS 0.89 1.12 1.28 1.71
Switzerland -0.02 0.50 0.83 1.61
Croatia 0.20 0.67 0.97 1.69
Region of Europe -0.08 0.70 1.16 2.19
Russia -0.01 0.42 0.70 1.35
Region of Former USSR -0.03 0.17 0.46 1.79
China 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.76
Japan 0.00 0.17 0.27 0.53
United States 0.00 0.15 0.26 0.50
Mexico -0.03 0.15 0.27 0.56
Canada -0.03 0.35 0.59 1.18
Latin America -0.02 0.09 0.24 0.92
India -0.01 0.07 0.17 0.60
Korea 0.01 0.56 0.90 1.67
Thailand 0.06 0.20 0.44 1.64
Region of Asia 0.02 0.19 0.45 1.70
Turkey 0.03 0.28 0.43 0.78
MENA and Middle East -0.01 0.16 0.39 1.50
Region of Africa -0.03 0.15 0.40 1.55
Australia and Oceania -0.03 0.37 0.62 1.22
The scenarios of limited liberalization („100-30-10” and „100-50-25”) show relatively low gains 
for developing countries. It is only in the case of the full liberalization, when these gains amount 
to more than 1% of the GDP in selected cases.
A drop in prices of imported services cause an obvious increase in Polish imports of services. 
Table 5 shows the simulated changes in services imports. However, given the relatively low initial 
level of services trade, the large percentage gains do not translate to large values in absolute terms. 
The largest imports are concentrated in sectors where the initial level of barriers was the highest 
– communications, air transport and business services.
Given the multilateral character of liberalization scenarios, the demand for Polish exports is 
also rising. The simulated changes in exports are presented in Tabele 6. Similarly, as in the case of 
imports, these changes are large and amount to even 40% in the case of communications services 
and 20% in the case of air transport and financial services and roughly 10–20% for the remaining 
service sectors. We can observe also a minor decrease in exports of manufactures in the scenarios 
of asymmetric liberalization (100-30-10 and 100-50-25) indicating a shift in the specialization of   
EU countries towards services. The scale of those changes is, however, insignificant.J. Hagemejer, J.J. Michałek, T. Michałek 20
Detailed changes in the direction of Polish services trade in different sectors for the 100-50-
-25 scenario are given in Table 3 and Table 4 in the Appendix. One can observe that given the 
asymmetric character of this scenario, in most sectors the decrease in prices leads to an increase 
of both imports and exports with other EU members. In particular, changes in the trade volume 
with selected EU countries and in selected services may amount to over 50%. However, due to the 
Table 5
Changes in Polish imports (in percent)
Sector
Scenario
EU 100-30-10 100-50-25 Maximum
Agriculture -0.18 0.31 0.61 1.25
Mining and minerals 0.46 0.72 0.91 1.37
Manufacturing 0.73 0.63 0.58 0.49
Utilities 1.22 0.72 0.44 -0.12
Construction 12.60 14.11 15.20 18.23
Trade 9.75 14.71 18.26 28.10
Other transport 19.37 27.45 33.22 49.00
Water transport 13.89 15.27 16.40 19.89
Air transport 30.25 35.48 39.49 51.03
Communications 76.37 87.76 96.77 124.18
Finance 13.57 16.64 18.80 24.60
Insurance 14.02 17.41 19.82 26.37
Business 19.84 25.12 28.91 39.42
Entertainment & other 13.01 15.04 16.46 20.34
Non-market services 15.44 27.88 36.83 61.57
Table 6
Changes in Polish exports (in percent)
Sector
Scenario
EU 100-30-10 100-50-25 Maximum
Agriculture -0.26 0.02 0.24 0.92
Mining and minerals -3.87 -1.42 0.24 4.54
Manufacturing -2.55 -1.27 -0.46 1.35
Utilities -1.39 -0.54 0.00 1.22
Construction 7.15 7.28 7.46 8.28
Trade 4.57 1.89 0.11 -4.38
Other transport 9.12 7.73 6.99 5.81
Water transport 2.50 1.28 0.54 -1.11
Air transport 25.98 19.61 15.79 8.20
Communications 46.14 42.90 41.30 40.56
Finance 26.07 26.57 27.29 30.71
Insurance 9.76 11.07 12.24 16.31
Business 16.60 14.62 13.41 10.77
Entertainment & other 8.34 9.36 10.20 12.92
Non-market services 19.44 14.26 11.39 6.16Implications of the Doha Round negotiations ... 21
low initial volume of trade, they do not translate into significant amounts in absolute terms. The 
changes in the volume of trade correspond to the extent of bilateral trade liberalization – if a pair 
of countries experienced a similar initial level of trade barriers, similar trade share in services 
and similar extent of liberalization, they will increase both the level of exports and the level of 
imports. However, if liberalization is less symmetric, trade balance will deteriorate in a country 
that liberalized relatively less. This is especially true in the case of developed-developing countries 
pairs in the asymmetric scenario such as 100-50-25, where imports from developing countries 
increase by more than exports to developing countries. In such scenarios, the producers in the 
developing countries are clearly gaining from the liberalization exercise.
The changes in imported services lead to a decrease in domestic demand for domestically 
supplied services. However due to an increase in external demand, exports go up. The detailed 
changes in output are given in Table 7, which shows that the increase in output is mostly   
concentrated in the road and rail transport sectors. Also, output of construction services is 
expected to go up, as well as trade and other market services. All these sectors are believed to 
confirm a comparative advantage of Poland as suggested by the simple RCA indices discussed 
earlier.
As far as output composition in other countries is concerned, the relevant simulated output 
changes are given for the 100-50-25 scenario in Table 2 in the Appendix. The output changes 
are modest in service sectors that to some extent require commercial presence: construction and 
trade;23 they correspond to low ratio of service trade shares to output in most countries. On the 
other side of the range are communications (with the major part of output gains concentrated in the 
Netherlands), where most countries experience significant changes in output and transport. The 
23    These results change, had the effects of FDI and competition been taken into account. See discussion towards the 
end of the text for details.
Table 7
Changes in output (in percent)
Sector
Scenario
EU 100-30-10 100-50-25 Maximum
Agriculture -0.17 -0.01 0.10 0.36
Mining and minerals -1.31 -0.71 -0.33 0.58
Manufacturing -0.71 -0.29 -0.02 0.58
Utilities 0.00 0.13 0.21 0.40
Construction 0.76 0.52 0.37 0.01
Trade 0.52 0.43 0.38 0.27
Other transport 1.48 0.97 0.66 0.02
Water transport 0.93 -0.33 -1.11 -2.91
Air transport 7.71 2.76 -0.36 -7.05
Communications -2.35 -3.22 -3.82 -5.31
Finance -0.18 -0.20 -0.21 -0.22
Insurance -0.86 -1.30 -1.55 -2.02
Business -0.12 -0.64 -0.99 -1.88
Entertainment & other 0.93 0.98 1.03 1.25
Non-market services 0.51 0.42 0.37 0.29J. Hagemejer, J.J. Michałek, T. Michałek 22
output changes are more concentrated within the high-income countries, where both the degree of 
liberalization and the initial service trade share are high. Especially very small open economies 
such as the Czech Republic or Switzerland are affected by the high output changes.
Table 8 shows simulated changes in producer prices and factor wages. Due to liberalization 
scenarios, the model economy shows an increase in wages of capital and labour in Poland. This is 
due to the resource constraint and the fact that the supply of labour is chosen exogenously in our 
simulations. An increase in wages and costs of capital causes an increase in the costs of production 
of many services (dampened by the drop in costs of imported intermediates). The increase of costs 
of production together with an increase of demand for exported services leads to an increase of 
producer prices of many exported services. A drop in producer prices is shown by the sectors where 
demand falls due to a shift of consumers towards imported services (e.g. financial services).
Given the drop in prices of exported services and an increase in real wages, the welfare effect 
of all liberalization scenarios is positive (except for the third countries in the “EU” scenario). The 
welfare gain measured by the equivalent variation is in most cases positive (simulated gains are 
given in Table 9). The welfare gains for Poland amount to roughly 0.6–0.7% of the initial level 
of GDP depending on a choice of scenario (except the “Maximum” scenario). More pronounced 
welfare gains are expected for countries that are relatively bigger traders of services. In most EU 15 
countries the gains amount to more than 1% of GDP. This applies also to some open economies of 
New Member States (e.g. the Czech Republic).
Table 8
Changes in producer prices and wages (in percent)
Sector
Scenario
EU 100-30-10 100-50-25 Maximum
Land -2.11 -0.60 0.40 2.85
Unskilled labour 1.29 0.90 0.66 0.08
Skilled labour 1.50 0.99 0.67 -0.07
Capital 1.30 0.80 0.49 -0.26
Agriculture 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.39
Mining and minerals 0.35 0.29 0.26 0.18
Manufacturing 0.76 0.38 0.13 -0.47
Utilities 0.95 0.57 0.32 -0.26
Construction 0.90 0.46 0.17 -0.52
Trade 0.91 0.42 0.11 -0.66
Other transport 0.47 -0.08 -0.45 -1.34
Water transport -1.85 -2.71 -3.29 -4.73
Air transport 0.09 -0.51 -0.91 -1.88
Communications 0.50 -0.05 -0.41 -1.31
Finance -0.14 -0.83 -1.29 -2.42
Insurance 0.57 -0.01 -0.39 -1.32
Business 0.84 0.32 -0.03 -0.86
Entertainment & other 0.84 0.34 0.01 -0.78
Non-market services 1.10 0.62 0.31 -0.43Implications of the Doha Round negotiations ... 23
Table 9
Welfare effects – equivalent variation (in percent of initial value of GDP)
Region
Scenario
EU 100-30-10 100-50-25 Maximum
Poland 0.61 0.66 0.70 0.83
Germany 0.77 0.95 1.08 1.44
UK 0.89 1.03 1.14 1.45
Netherlands 1.77 2.09 2.32 2.93
France 0.66 0.71 0.76 0.92
Italy 0.71 0.85 0.95 1.21
Czech Republic 1.33 1.58 1.76 2.26
Region of EU 15 0.98 1.19 1.34 1.77
Region of NMS 1.23 1.35 1.45 1.75
Switzerland -0.20 0.41 0.80 1.73
Croatia -0.41 0.62 1.29 2.97
Region of Europe -0.27 0.50 0.97 2.04
Russia -0.07 0.42 0.73 1.48
Region of Former USSR -0.09 0.18 0.50 1.89
China 0.00 0.14 0.30 0.94
Japan -0.01 0.14 0.25 0.49
United States -0.05 0.10 0.20 0.43
Mexico -0.05 0.16 0.30 0.65
Canada -0.09 0.32 0.59 1.25
Latin America -0.06 0.11 0.29 1.04
India -0.04 0.09 0.24 0.78
Korea -0.03 0.47 0.77 1.48
Thailand -0.05 0.24 0.57 1.97
Region of Asia -0.03 0.26 0.60 1.98
Turkey -0.10 0.26 0.49 1.04
MENA and Middle East -0.09 0.19 0.50 1.72
Region of Africa -0.07 0.17 0.47 1.71
Australia and Oceania -0.08 0.34 0.61 1.28
5. Discussion of results
The reader has to be aware that the presented results, showing a rather modest impact of service trade 
liberalization, partially stems from the fact that we analyse the matter in a simplified setting, applied 
previously to merchandise trade data. The model assumes perfect competition in product and service 
markets. Therefore, the analysis does not encompass the pro-competitive effects of trade liberalization 
that through tightening of price-cost margins and exploitation of specialization and scale economies 
may lead to further welfare and production gains. These may not only generate direct welfare gains,24 
but also indirect ones through general equilibrium effects and the intermediate use of services by the 
manufacturing firms (see, for example, Arnold, Javorcik, Mattoo 2006). Some of other peculiarities 
of the service sectors are not taken into account. Even with the expansion of electronic provision 
of services, some types of services requires physical and commercial presence, and modelling of 
24    However, even if those effects are taken into account, as demonstrated by the analysis in Decreux, Fontagne (2006), 
the simulated gains are small at best, amounting to roughly 0.3% of world welfare in the most ambitious scenario 
encompassing merchandise, agricultural and service trade liberalization, of which more than half is attributed to 
service trade liberalization.J. Hagemejer, J.J. Michałek, T. Michałek 24
that phenomenon requires treatment of foreign direct investment, which the standard GTAP model 
formulation does not offer. Similarly, the labour endowments in the GTAP model are fixed and labour 
is immobile internationally and therefore we also ignore the effects of labour migrations which may 
be important, especially when trade liberalization within the European Union Single Market are 
concerned. According to Whalley (2003), inclusion of those effects in the theoretical framework could 
impact both the size and direction of results.
6. Summary
Our simulations demonstrate, that benefits for Poland from liberalization of trade in services are 
modest and do not exceed one percent of the country’s GDP. The welfare gains, resulting from lower 
prices for consumers, are of similar order. All simulations show that thanks to the liberalization the 
volume of trade in services will grow significantly (in many sectors up to several dozen per cent), 
both for exports and imports. They also show that internal EU liberalization of trade in services is 
more important for Poland in comparison to possible liberalization in the framework of the Doha 
Round. The increase in global demand will push up sales of construction services and transport, 
in which Poland has revealed comparative advantage. In some other sectors, like business and 
communication services, Polish providers of services will decrease their sales.
  The results of our simulations shall be treated with caution. The GTAP model in the form 
employed in this paper does not take into consideration benefits resulting from mark-up reduction 
(increased competition), movement of natural persons (fourth mode of supply) or increase of foreign 
direct investments. These results should also be treated as short-run since they do not take into 
account additional capital accumulation nor trade driven knowledge spillovers. Therefore, the scale 
of changes could have been more pronounced if other channels of interaction had been considered 
(increased competition, technological progress, capital accumulation and scale economies).
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exp. 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.0
imp. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.1
Brazil
exp. 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
imp. 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Canada
exp. 1.6 0.5 0.1 4.3 3.7 6.5 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.8 1.5
imp. 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 1.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.9 0.2
Switzer-
land
exp. 0.6 3.3 1.6 1.1 4.7 1.8 3.9 6.2 1.5 3.4 0.3 14.2 3.2
imp. 0.0 1.0 0.9 5.0 3.0 2.1 1.1 1.0 0.0 0.9 0.8 10.7 1.3
China
exp. 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.3 2.3 1.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0
imp. 0.0 2.1 12.5 0.1 4.5 0.0 1.0 1.8 0.0 3.6 0.3 0.6 0.2
Egypt
exp. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
imp. 0.0 0.1 3.7 1.8 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.5
Hong 
Kong
exp. 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.1
imp. 0.0 1.2 0.6 0.0 1.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Croatia
exp. 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
imp. 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.8
Israel
exp. 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.1
imp. 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3
India
exp. 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
imp. 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
Japan
exp. 10.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 2.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.1
imp. 16.3 1.0 1.4 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Republic 
of Korea
exp. 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0
imp. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Norway
exp. 0.0 1.6 5.0 0.2 0.5 3.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 3.0 0.6 0.8 1.0
imp. 0.0 0.9 1.7 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.2 2.0 1.1 0.6
Russian 
Federation
exp. 0.0 1.3 0.5 3.5 0.9 5.7 2.2 2.7 0.0 2.9 2.0 0.0 0.9
imp. 0.0 1.8 0.0 1.1 5.0 0.6 8.0 6.1 0.0 0.2 0.7 1.1 1.1
Turkey
exp. 1.9 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 2.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
imp. 0.0 0.4 0.1 1.8 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.5
Taiwan
exp. 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
imp. 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
United 
States
exp. 0.6 25.6 5.2 29.5 13.0 21.1 1.8 2.1 0.0 4.6 3.0 10.3 7.2
imp. 0.9 18.5 8.4 8.7 5.7 40.7 1.5 1.4 0.5 1.6 4.5 10.1 11.0Implications of the Doha Round negotiations ... 2















































































































































































































































































































































































































0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
Brazil
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
Canada
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.0
0.1 0.1 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.3 1.4 0.0 0.2
Switzerland
0.8 22.5 5.2 3.0 3.5 1.1 13.0 10.3 4.6 8.4 0.0 10.3
1.0 2.8 2.7 6.5 4.0 3.9 10.8 4.7 11.9 3.1 4.4 14.6
China
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Egypt
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0
Hong Kong
0.0 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Croatia
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
Israel
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 2.2 0.0
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.0
India
0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Japan
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.1 0.0 1.4 0.0 2.2
Republic  
of Korea
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Norway
11.4 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.0 3.6 1.7 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.0
10.7 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.2 3.0 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.8
Russian  
Federation
11.5 38.0 2.8 0.6 1.0 1.5 1.1 1.6 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.2
40.6 1.6 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.3 3.9 1.2 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.1
Turkey
0.7 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Taiwan
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
United  
States
1.1 0.0 3.6 12.2 19.9 1.9 3.5 6.0 6.1 7.7 0.0 22.5
0.4 8.9 1.2 9.6 14.0 13.4 5.5 5.4 16.8 16.1 4.4 14.1
Notes:
Values in the table are in percent; values exceeding 1% are marked in bold.
















































































































































Poland 0.37 0.38 0.66 -1.11 -0.36 -3.82 -0.21 -1.55 -0.99 1.03 0.37
Germany 0.45 0.45 -2.93 -1.40 -6.57 -0.18 0.32 0.26 -0.88 0.06 0.56
UK 0.87 0.26 -1.64 -2.64 -2.83 -0.47 1.23 1.56 0.38 0.45 -0.10
Netherlands 4.89 0.53 -3.62 -1.36 29.02 4.56 -1.85 1.90 -2.35 1.94 1.03
France 0.94 -0.14 -1.42 -1.32 -5.36 -1.75 -0.17 1.05 -0.76 0.92 0.45
Italy 1.02 -0.11 0.18 3.38 11.56 -0.47 -0.65 -1.28 -0.48 0.75 0.38
Czech  
Republic
0.36 0.67 -0.71 -5.01 4.59 0.87 -1.80 -3.42 -1.10 1.74 0.94
Region  
of EU 15
1.36 0.27 1.94 -1.23 5.27 -0.39 -1.92 -3.57 -3.84 -0.12 0.77
Region  
of NMS
1.61 -0.04 -0.10 -5.42 -2.79 -0.57 -0.74 -0.84 -0.55 2.61 0.87
Switzerland 0.76 0.05 -4.82 -8.15 -5.75 -3.34 -0.43 -0.25 -1.07 0.04 0.70
Croatia 2.86 0.59 0.74 -3.44 -13.72 -0.07 -2.12 -4.03 -0.37 -0.04 -0.17
Region  
of Europe
1.35 0.27 -0.72 -3.04 -6.22 -2.02 -0.09 -1.36 -2.66 -0.06 0.30
Russia -0.04 -0.12 -1.56 -7.24 -8.23 -2.70 0.18 0.32 -0.46 0.16 0.43
Region of  
Former USSR
-0.27 0.13 0.08 -3.75 -7.81 -0.70 -0.19 -0.17 -0.50 0.33 0.47
China -0.05 1.81 0.42 -4.04 -5.13 -0.96 0.62 -0.61 1.08 0.15 0.27
Japan -0.17 0.01 -0.48 -1.49 -10.72 -0.83 -0.18 -0.25 -0.76 0.00 0.06
United States -0.32 -0.01 -1.73 -2.62 -7.69 -1.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.50 -0.20 0.15
Mexico -0.18 0.04 0.10 -1.49 -4.43 -1.24 0.24 -0.89 -0.13 0.19 -0.10
Canada 0.31 0.12 -0.99 -4.46 -6.74 -3.45 -0.59 -1.61 -1.73 0.66 0.36
Latin America -0.26 0.14 0.25 -9.61 -7.72 -0.95 -0.01 0.29 -0.01 0.60 0.17
India -0.04 0.27 0.24 -1.55 -1.76 -0.07 0.03 -0.09 3.84 0.10 0.10
Korea 0.42 0.22 0.16 7.46 -2.91 -1.36 0.36 0.63 -1.75 0.47 0.53
Thailand 0.71 0.59 0.02 -6.80 -6.25 -1.48 0.12 -0.89 0.43 0.90 0.19
Region of Asia 0.47 0.62 -0.18 -5.07 -7.06 -1.34 0.06 0.48 2.06 0.51 0.33
Turkey -0.30 0.71 -0.02 -6.44 -8.98 -2.36 -0.72 -1.96 0.47 2.73 -0.15
MENA and 
Middle East
0.31 0.45 0.73 -4.50 -5.62 -0.79 0.27 -0.80 0.14 0.15 0.08
Region  
of Africa
-0.03 0.06 -0.08 -8.66 -7.44 -1.51 0.19 0.61 -1.36 0.00 0.20
Australia and 
Oceania
-0.02 0.10 -0.76 -2.85 -6.98 -2.18 -0.11 -0.58 -0.92 0.54 0.31Implications of the Doha Round negotiations ... 2
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Germany 11.74 -0.93 27.06 13.94 32.68 41.56 37.54 30.97 22.63 18.43 22.81
UK 10.43 8.10 23.53 34.97 40.93 82.44 45.20 34.81 28.55 15.46 25.02
Netherlands 21.04 1.61 31.27 13.70 28.98 36.57 41.09 20.62 23.62 16.44 13.99
France 11.42 5.54 30.16 14.07 41.15 88.59 39.53 33.46 27.83 20.44 27.54
Italy 12.97 5.49 23.95 12.69 4.52 31.25 44.12 21.72 25.11 16.73 23.65
Czech  
Republic 11.23 8.17 30.16 51.19 8.68 87.00 33.12 26.18 26.44 19.29 28.73
Region  
of EU 15
15.80 8.51 30.97 39.71 40.73 76.60 36.26 26.74 23.50 19.23 31.13
Region  
of NMS
13.43 6.18 32.71 41.96 31.47 83.65 38.36 30.71 27.02 13.22 26.05
Switzerland 1.02 -2.05 1.86 3.38 -1.15 26.44 17.51 1.83 5.49 5.02 1.30
Croatia 5.59 1.47 9.09 25.97 -14.03 36.79 20.73 14.70 5.02 7.91 4.64
Region  
of Europe
4.45 -1.73 -0.92 -13.50 -6.85 7.31 17.16 4.45 -1.37 -2.39 2.12
Russia 2.20 -1.67 3.84 7.40 11.47 27.75 9.60 -3.52 -4.80 5.79 0.00
Region of  
Former USSR
0.69 -0.58 4.57 13.38 0.02 15.80 10.68 5.80 2.50 -0.74 0.01
China 1.34 3.31 3.61 11.28 7.99 15.06 10.25 4.18 0.48 2.62 0.15
Japan 1.13 -4.52 3.00 -13.11 5.13 29.00 14.51 10.48 6.66 4.85 -0.62
United States -2.06 -7.17 5.12 24.43 13.60 24.76 15.02 9.11 5.70 3.00 2.65
Mexico -1.79 -2.96 6.46 28.52 11.77 29.72 15.34 4.23 5.29 5.34 0.96
Canada 0.71 -3.55 4.11 16.87 15.56 26.01 10.32 5.31 2.45 4.46 -1.04
Latin America 0.26 -2.13 2.28 1.43 2.33 11.93 10.70 5.25 2.78 2.21 -0.59
India -0.55 -1.38 -0.29 -7.39 -15.16 3.27 10.97 1.60 -3.66 2.76 -3.33
Korea 1.45 -4.49 -1.71 -12.66 -11.91 16.34 18.71 7.14 1.72 5.10 2.16
Thailand 0.34 -3.18 2.16 4.14 1.96 12.13 10.98 2.25 0.18 3.42 0.02
Region of Asia 1.83 -1.66 1.73 2.98 -1.07 11.23 11.14 4.63 1.52 3.76 0.06
Turkey 2.30 -1.98 -3.47 0.42 3.24 21.23 9.51 -0.35 4.32 4.31 -1.17
MENA and 
Middle East
1.38 -1.49 1.26 5.22 -2.39 17.43 11.08 4.86 2.78 3.24 0.19
Region of 
Africa
0.44 -2.00 3.58 8.26 2.15 15.05 10.61 4.73 0.95 2.29 -0.62
Australia  
and Oceania 0.08 -4.46 2.86 -6.48 10.00 23.56 16.49 8.88 5.25 4.11 0.36J. Hagemejer, J.J. Michałek, T. Michałek 30
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Germany 11.59 8.79 34.18 14.33 21.37 86.67 31.19 24.42 24.00 18.36 29.18
UK 10.62 6.03 29.26 6.49 24.66 76.15 28.18 26.32 25.29 19.44 27.12
Netherlands 5.57 1.49 23.76 -2.93 64.39 91.50 18.09 18.57 19.54 15.67 16.72
France 11.84 6.09 31.94 2.77 23.13 73.90 31.39 25.14 24.83 17.20 27.64
Italy 8.50 3.83 28.55 16.95 41.45 74.71 22.48 18.73 20.00 14.58 23.05
Czech  
Republic 11.15 6.95 30.82 -7.24 20.43 75.52 32.01 27.57 24.79 18.32 25.48
Region  
of EU 15
14.69 12.71 46.59 7.80 37.32 80.37 -4.04 -4.24 15.94 15.36 36.36
Region  
of NMS 10.30 5.59 30.18 -5.65 21.67 75.30 27.96 24.15 24.47 19.52 26.05
Switzerland -5.18 -6.19 -6.19 -39.45 -29.55 -3.24 -6.22 -7.71 -1.50 3.18 7.97
Croatia 5.12 14.73 5.36 -46.02 -35.15 -8.13 -9.17 -11.89 8.04 1.42 7.98
Region 
of Europe
-6.90 -2.04 0.28 -34.25 -25.08 -15.76 -3.80 -4.55 -4.37 2.18 -3.88
Russia 13.98 12.42 6.32 -43.77 -33.91 -4.89 13.14 6.95 14.80 5.58 11.89
Region  
of Former  
USSR
13.22 9.68 5.37 -44.25 -34.90 -6.68 5.50 2.25 5.51 4.35 9.54
China 15.44 18.66 8.52 -43.38 -34.48 -4.91 10.90 7.10 6.23 7.71 13.35
Japan -4.37 -8.84 4.11 -38.00 -31.81 -8.38 3.31 -0.36 0.38 -3.97 11.09
United States -3.22 -7.72 -1.28 -42.06 -32.04 -16.95 -7.16 -9.96 -4.13 -6.97 13.04
Mexico 15.76 8.01 9.31 -42.97 -34.04 -9.84 14.70 10.45 8.25 5.04 3.45
Canada -1.85 -3.19 -6.94 -39.52 -32.94 -14.73 0.30 -5.06 -0.02 10.89 17.60
Latin America 15.30 10.68 10.82 -41.78 -33.68 -11.06 9.51 5.76 9.39 7.59 14.66
India 21.51 17.63 11.43 -43.52 -33.81 -5.54 7.67 4.51 9.69 5.75 10.07
Korea 5.65 7.33 6.91 -19.47 -24.83 -0.22 8.28 5.47 3.35 5.31 13.75
Thailand 17.71 16.20 3.78 -43.58 -34.90 -4.92 8.35 4.88 7.30 4.47 13.17
Region of Asia 12.65 17.18 7.18 -42.40 -33.58 -7.43 3.55 1.11 9.22 4.65 10.40
Turkey -6.52 17.22 0.59 -42.65 -34.42 -19.66 -11.00 -13.13 3.27 7.32 8.57
MENA and 
Middle East
19.05 15.98 8.11 -43.07 -35.12 -6.33 3.90 0.71 6.98 5.30 13.23
Region  
of Africa
10.21 4.25 6.35 -43.86 -34.23 -13.56 13.73 9.69 3.69 5.34 6.21
Australia  
and Oceania 2.81 -3.96 7.76 -36.72 -32.10 -1.99 -3.65 -6.99 -1.27 5.42 3.87